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Auer in Action:  
Deference After Talk America 
CYNTHIA BARMORE 
For decades, judges and commentators took for granted that courts 
should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation, unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation. In 2011, however, Justice Scalia 
announced his growing discontent with Auer deference in Talk 
America, and the Court has since rolled back Auer’s scope in recent 
decisions. While Auer’s judicial and academic critics have explored 
the theoretical dangers inherent in the doctrine, they have paid little 
attention to how courts apply Auer in practice. This Article adds to the 
literature on Auer deference by providing the first in-depth analysis of 
how federal courts of appeals have reacted to the Court’s recent Auer 
decisions. In the end, the data suggest that there is little to gain (and 
much to lose) by overruling Auer. 
 
The results, drawn from an original data set of all 190 Auer cases 
decided by courts of appeals since 2011, reveal Auer is no longer the 
extremely deferential doctrine it was once considered to be. The rate 
at which courts grant Auer deference fell from 2011 to 2014 among 
both Republican and Democratic judges. Overall, deference is most 
common in traditionally conservative courts of appeals, when the 
agency is party to the litigation, and when the agency’s interpretation 
appears in an agency order or public issuance. The results also reveal 
why courts do—and do not—defer. When courts grant Auer deference, 
they rarely view the agency’s interpretation as unpersuasive, and 
when they withhold Auer deference, they typically rely on Auer’s 
historical boundaries. The data confirm that courts already have and 
use the necessary tools to reject unreasonable agency interpretations, 
while overruling Auer would bring substantial costs in lost 
predictability and reduced political accountability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, judges and commentators took for granted that courts should 
defer to agency interpretations of their own regulations. This doctrine, 
interchangeably called Auer or Seminole Rock deference, is a staple of 
administrative law.1 It instructs that “[w]hen an agency interprets its own 
regulation, the Court, as a general rule, defers to it ‘unless that interpretation is 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”’”2 In contrast to 
Chevron deference, which urges courts to adopt reasonable agency 
interpretations of the statutes they administer,3 Auer deference deals with 
agency interpretations of the regulations they write. Ultimately, Auer leaves 
defining the scope of an ambiguous regulation largely to the agency that 
promulgated it. 
In recent years, however, some Justices on the Supreme Court have picked 
up on academic criticism of Auer. They have been raising the doctrine’s 
profile and working to scale it back in a series of recent decisions, leading 
Auer to be described as under siege.4 While courts originally deferred to all 
but plainly erroneous or inconsistent interpretations,5 the Court has narrowed 
Auer to withhold deference where the interpretation causes unfair surprise,6 or 
where the underlying regulation parrots the statutory language7 or is 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 2 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013) (quoting Chase Bank 
USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)). 
 3 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 4 See Jeffrey Pojanowski, More on Agency Interpretations of Regulations: Taking 
Deference Seriously, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/more-on-agency-interpretations-of-regulations-taking-deference 
-seriously-by-jeffrey-pojanowski [http://perma.cc/N692-QPXM].  
 5 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
 6 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012). 
 7 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
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unambiguous.8 Many have urged the Court to overrule Auer entirely,9 and four 
members of the Court have announced their willingness to consider it.10 
The debate so far has been largely theoretical, centering on Auer’s 
incentives for agencies, its risks to the separation of powers, and its practical 
benefits.11 An emerging literature has begun to trace the Court’s recent 
decisions narrowing Auer,12 but little attention has been paid to how lower 
courts apply Auer or the effects of those decisions in lower courts.13 As the 
Court considers overruling Auer, it should be aware of how courts of appeals 
apply the doctrine in practice, and what the Court has already accomplished 
through its recent Auer jurisprudence. 
This Article adds to the emerging literature on Auer deference by 
providing a window into how federal courts of appeals apply Auer and how 
they have reacted to the Court’s recent Auer decisions. Drawing on an original 
data set of 190 cases, which includes all Auer cases decided by courts of 
appeals since 2011 when Justice Scalia first announced his interest in 
reconsidering the doctrine,14 this Article focuses on Auer’s practical 
dimensions. Part II provides a conceptual background for the discussion, 
offering an overview of common arguments for and against Auer, and tracing 
the Court’s recent Auer jurisprudence. Part III draws lessons from the data, 
and Part IV uses these insights to weigh the costs and benefits of overruling 
Auer. The results reveal several important findings: 
First, courts of appeals have responded to the Court’s recent Auer 
decisions by narrowing their application of the doctrine, leading to a steady 
decline from 2011 to 2014 in the rate at which courts grant Auer deference. 
                                                                                                                     
 8 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). 
 9 See, e.g., Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 10 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., and Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 11 Compare John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680–81 (1996) (arguing 
against Auer), with Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock 
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 112–16 (2000) 
(arguing in favor of Auer). 
 12 See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and Future of Auer Deference: 
Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 
U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 633 (2014). 
 13 The most in-depth treatment to date is a study of Auer deference in courts of 
appeals and district courts, which measured the overall rate of deference during 1999 to 
2001 and 2005 to 2007. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 
(2011). That study, however, did not explore factors for when or why those courts granted 
deference, and it did not consider the post-Talk America period. 
 14 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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Between 2011 and 2012, courts granted Auer deference in 82.3% of cases. 
Since the Court’s 2013 decision in Decker v. Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center,15 that rate has fallen to 70.6%. For critics concerned that Auer 
is a form of super-deference that requires courts to adopt ill-reasoned agency 
interpretations, the data show that courts of appeals now have—and use—a 
variety of tools to reject improper agency interpretations. There is also no 
evidence that political ideology has driven the change. Rather, deference has 
fallen over time among judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic 
presidents. 
Second, the data show when courts defer and the factors that correspond to 
the highest rates of Auer deference. Historically conservative circuits, 
including the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh, grant Auer deference most often, 
while the Ninth and D.C. Circuits are markedly more hesitant. Some agencies 
invoke Auer more often than others, particularly the Department of Labor and 
the Bureau of Immigration Affairs, but those agencies also receive it at lower 
rates than others. An agency’s interpretation prevails more often when the 
agency is party to the litigation than when it is not, but the court regularly 
refuses to defer if the agency’s interpretation simply appears in its party brief. 
Instead, courts defer most often when the interpretation appears in the 
agency’s order or public issuance. 
Third, the data reveal two key lessons about why courts do or do not defer. 
First, among courts that grant Auer deference, it is extremely rare for a court to 
indicate that Auer requires it to adopt an interpretation it would otherwise 
reject. Instead, most courts use Auer as a shortcut to avoid lengthy regulatory 
analysis or conclude that the agency’s position is a reasonable exercise of 
discretion to decide an unanswered policy question. Second, among courts that 
reject Auer deference, they typically rely on Auer’s traditional boundaries. 
Rather than use one of the Court’s new limits on Auer, most courts of appeals 
that withhold deference simply reason that the agency’s interpretation is 
plainly erroneous, inconsistent with the regulation, or not the product of the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment. 
It is only a matter of time before the Court decides to revisit Auer.16 When 
it does, it can draw on these results to better understand the role Auer has 
played since Talk America. The results demonstrate that the Court has already 
accomplished a significant amount with its recent Auer decisions, and 
common concerns about Auer have not materialized in practice. Courts today 
can and do reject inappropriate agency interpretations within Auer’s existing 
framework. In sum, Auer already has meaningful limits. Overruling Auer 
would accomplish little beyond removing a useful tool that facilitates judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1326. 
 16 See id. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The bar is now aware that there is 
some interest in reconsidering [Auer], and has available to it a concise statement of the 
arguments on one side of the issue.”). 
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review, increases the predictability of regulatory action, and maintains 
political accountability in agency decision-making. 
II. VIEW FROM THE TOP: AUER DEFERENCE 
A. Auer’s Critics and Defenders 
Since the mid-1990s, Auer deference has attracted increasing attention 
among academics and spurred an emerging literature on its benefits and costs. 
Underlying much of the discussion is a sense that Auer is a forceful form of 
deference that all but insulates agency action from review, compelling courts 
to adopt unsupported agency interpretations of their own regulations.17 That 
reputation largely stems from a 2008 study that found the Court granted Auer 
deference in 91% of relevant cases, making Auer the second strongest form of 
deference after Curtiss-Wright for executive interpretations related to foreign 
affairs and national security.18 While the existing literature on Auer suggests a 
less deferential picture in the courts of appeals,19 courts have called Auer 
“extremely deferential,”20 and academic commentators observe the doctrine 
remains a “potent tool of policy making.”21 
Auer’s critics have seized on the doctrine’s power as a starting point for 
opposing its continued use. Because Auer removes the court’s discretion to 
reject an agency’s improper (but permissible) interpretation, they argue, it 
places decision-making power in the agency and removes the court’s ability to 
independently decide the meaning or application of an agency’s regulation.22 
Critics offer a formalist objection to Auer, contending it offends the core 
principle of the separation of powers and that constitutional norms should 
inform how courts interpret ambiguous regulations.23 The problem, the 
argument goes, is straightforward: Auer allows an agency to both write the law 
(the regulation) and determine its application by requiring courts to defer to 
                                                                                                                     
 17 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 12, at 680, 693 (“For many years, courts have 
employed a very deferential standard of review . . . [that] has been widely accepted and 
applied . . . .”); Manning, supra note 11, at 628 (arguing that Auer compels the court to 
adopt the agency’s interpretation “unless the agency view is entirely out of bounds”). 
 18 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1083, 1098, 1101, 1142 (2008) (“[T]he rare invocation of . . . Seminole Rock 
deference . . . virtually assures the agency a legal victory.”). 
 19 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 13, at 519 (finding courts upheld agency action 76% of 
the time during 1999 to 2001 and 2005 to 2007). 
 20 Alhambra Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 21 Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of Labor’s 
Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (2013). 
 22 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 12, at 680; Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should 
We Care About an Agency’s Special Insight?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 915, 919 
(2013) (“The deleterious incentives encourage the misuse of interpretive power.”). 
 23 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 11, at 680–81. 
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any plausible interpretation the agency offers.24 Courts, rather than agencies, 
should hold “the ultimate interpretive power,”25 but Auer allows agencies to 
control judicial conclusions.26 
Another common criticism is that Auer encourages vague agency 
rulemaking that reduces notice to regulated parties.27 If Auer requires 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous (but not unambiguous) 
regulations, agencies would maximize future flexibility and power by 
promulgating ambiguous regulations.28 An ambiguous regulation would give 
the agency greater discretion when deciding which enforcement actions to 
bring and would increase the variety of positions it could take in subsequent 
litigation. An agency would be free to interpret or apply the regulation in 
whatever (plausible) way it considers most advantageous at the time, 
potentially even if it has offered a different interpretation in the past. Critics 
worry that the incentive to promulgate vague regulations would lead to 
predictably more ambiguous regulations, thereby giving regulated parties less 
notice of prohibited or required conduct.29 When agencies promulgate 
ambiguous regulations, critics argue, they fail to give regulated parties fair 
notice of the rules they must follow.30 
Critics also seize on the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural 
protections, arguing that Auer circumvents procedural limitations that 
Congress placed on agency rulemaking.31 The APA directs agencies to follow 
a number of procedural requirements when promulgating rules that bind 
regulated entities. Foremost among these are notice and comment, designed to 
give affected groups fair notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity to 
influence the agency’s position.32 Giving binding effect to the agency’s 
interpretation, critics argue, effectively allows the agency to promulgate a new 
rule (or add content to an existing rule), without following the APA’s 
procedural requirements of notice and comment. Under Auer, the agency’s 
interpretation is treated as part of the rule itself, even though the public was 
never afforded the opportunity to comment on that particular substantive 
addition. 
                                                                                                                     
 24 See Healy, supra note 12, at 680–85. 
 25 Id. at 692. 
 26 See DeGenaro, supra note 22, at 915. 
 27 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 11, at 662. 
 28 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They 
Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 6 (1996); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, 
Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1461 (2011). 
 29 See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 28, at 1461. 
 30 See id. at 1480. 
 31 See, e.g., id. at 1463–64. 
 32 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
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In contrast, Auer’s defenders primarily stress its functional benefits.33 
Even those skeptical of Auer recognize that it “cuts agencies helpful 
interpretive slack in a world in which life is short, resources are limited, and 
agencies must address complex issues that have unpredictable twists and 
turns.”34 As a starting point, agencies are argued to be superior policymakers 
to courts or (sometimes) Congress because of their greater technical expertise, 
efficiency, institutional flexibility, and political accountability.35 Accordingly, 
courts are particularly deferential to agencies when the interpretive question 
presents a highly technical or policy-oriented issue.36 For example, in Thomas 
Jefferson University v. Shalala, the Court granted Auer deference to an 
interpretation by the Department of Health and Human Services, reasoning 
that “broad deference is all the more warranted” when a regulation “concerns 
‘a complex and highly technical regulatory program,’” requiring “significant 
expertise and . . . exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.”37 These 
arguments contend that agencies are in the best position to interpret their 
regulations consistently with their policy goals, and that deferring to the 
agency allows it to accomplish those goals by determining how its regulations 
should be applied.38 
Auer also creates practical benefits beyond those generated in particular 
litigation. It increases an agency’s flexibility to balance competing interests 
when promulgating regulations.39 At times, the best regulation may not be the 
clearest possible formulation because enhanced clarity sacrifices regulatory 
accessibility and congruence.40 An accessible rule is one that can be applied 
easily to concrete situations, while a congruent rule is one that produces the 
desired behavior.41 An agency could try to answer every potential interpretive 
question, but such clarity would increase the length and complexity of 
regulations until they were too opaque for regulated parties to understand. 
Thus, a clear rule might be inaccessible because it is too unwieldy to apply to 
concrete situations, and it might be incongruous because regulated entities do 
                                                                                                                     
 33 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 12, at 691 (“Functionalism rather than formalism has, 
as we have seen, been at the center of the Court’s explanation of Seminole Rock 
deference . . . .”). 
 34 Manning, supra note 11, at 616–17. 
 35 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 28, at 1456, 1460. 
 36 See, e.g., Atrium Med. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 766 F.3d 560, 
568 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Auer deference . . . is ‘especially [applicable] in areas like Medicare 
reimbursements’ given the technical complexity of the reimbursement regime.” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Univ. of Cincinnati v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 1171, 1174 (6th 
Cir. 1984))).  
 37 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Pauley v. 
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)). 
 38 See Manning, supra note 11, at 630 (citing BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 696–97). 
 39 See, e.g., Angstreich, supra note 11, at 112–16. 
 40 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 
65, 67 (1983). 
 41 Id. 
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not know how to conform their behavior to the agency’s goals.42 Auer also 
allows agencies to wait to elaborate on the precise contours of their regulations 
until they gain experience implementing particular regulatory programs.43 
Auer tells agencies they need not attempt the impossible by anticipating 
every conceivable question about a regulation’s meaning. Instead, Auer allows 
agencies to apply their rules to unanticipated situations that fall within the 
interstices of the regulatory language.44 As with statutory interpretation, 
regulatory interpretation can involve “interstitial lawmaking” when the 
regulation is applied to a situation that falls between its clear terms.45 Under 
Auer, courts do not ask agencies to repeat the mistakes of Frederick the Great, 
whose civil code spanned 17,000 specific rules to govern every conceivable 
fact situation.46 As Frederick the Great quickly learned, courts inevitably 
confront unanticipated interpretive questions, no matter how clearly the rules 
are written.47 Auer thus allows agencies to apply their rules when needed, even 
if a regulation does not speak precisely to the situation at hand. 
Auer’s defenders also argue that even if the doctrine demands less clarity 
from agency regulations, it enhances clarity in another way by providing 
straightforward guidance for litigation. Deferring to the agency’s interpretation 
offers a clear rule that courts can follow to interpret the meaning of an 
ambiguous regulation, and it is a directive that litigants and agencies can 
reasonably predict and understand.48 There is a growing appreciation that 
regulatory interpretation is an underdeveloped field of study, with little 
agreement over how courts should engage in regulatory interpretation, in terms 
of goals, sources of law, and the relationship among those sources.49 
Eliminating Auer would make regulatory interpretation even less predictable 
by removing one clear tool that courts have.50 
Beyond pragmatic arguments for Auer, other supporters offer an 
“originalist” argument that contends the author of the regulation—the 
agency—has “special insight” into its meaning.51 Courts defer to the agency 
because the agency is in the best position to know what its own regulations 
mean. This position rests on two assumptions: first, that the agency’s current 
interpretation in fact reflects its intentions when it enacted the regulation, and 
                                                                                                                     
 42 Id. 
 43 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 28, at 1459. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Manning, supra note 11, at 629 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 
U.S. 555, 568 (1980)). 
 46 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 30 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the failure of the Prussian Landrecht of 1794). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Manning, supra note 11, at 694–95 (acknowledging Auer’s certainty benefits 
but arguing that “issues of determinacy cut both ways”). 
 49 See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 358 (2012). 
 50 See id. at 410 n.272. 
 51 See, e.g., Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 28, at 1454, 1457 (noting this 
rationale is in decline). 
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second, that the agency’s original interpretation should control the present 
application.52 However informal the interpretation, the argument goes, it still 
reflects the agency’s special insight.53 Some courts have granted Auer 
deference relying on this rationale. For example, the Federal Circuit adopted 
an originalist position when it granted Auer deference to an interpretation by 
the International Trade Commission, asserting Auer’s force stems from the 
fact that the agency “is addressing its own [intentions],” rather than those of 
Congress.54 
Finally, Auer’s defenders reject arguments that separation of powers 
principles or the APA dictate an end to the doctrine. Rather, they argue, Auer 
rests on a similar foundation as Chevron: Congress has the right to delegate 
legislative power to administrative agencies,55 and when Congress delegates 
rulemaking authority to an agency, it implicitly delegates power to offer 
reasonable interpretations that clarify the meaning of those rules.56 Relatedly, 
some argue that Auer is necessary to give full effect to Chevron’s distribution 
of interpretive authority, and thus included within Congress’s intent to 
delegate to agencies the power to interpret ambiguous statutes.57 This 
delegation requires courts to verify that agencies “have not exceeded the 
bounds of the authority delegated,”58 rather than replace agencies’ policy 
decisions with their own.59 
B. Narrowing Doctrine 
Following Auer’s critics, some Justices recently have begun to urge the 
Court to revisit the doctrine. The first serious sign came in 2011, when the 
Court considered the meaning of an FCC regulation in Talk America, Inc. v. 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.60 The Court recognized that no statute or 
regulation squarely addressed the question at hand, and it deferred to the 
FCC’s interpretation of its regulation contained in its amicus brief, a view the 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Id. at 1454. 
 53 Id. at 1456. 
 54 Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363–64 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). 
 55 See Manning, supra note 11, at 623 (arguing that “binding deference [under 
Chevron] is the product of Congress’s right to delegate legislative authority to 
administrative agencies”). 
 56 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 28, at 1457. 
 57 See Angstreich, supra note 11, at 112, 132. 
 58 Id. at 89. 
 59 Cf. Manning, supra note 11, at 626 (“[B]ecause it is now generally accepted that 
the interpretation of an ambiguous text will involve policymaking, Chevron makes sense of 
original constitutional commitments to electoral accountability by presuming that Congress 
has selected agencies rather than courts to resolve serious ambiguities in agency-
administered statutes.”). 
 60 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2257 (2011). 
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Court described as “more than reasonable.”61 While the FCC’s interpretation 
was novel, the Court recognized there was “no danger” that granting Auer 
deference would allow the FCC, “under the guise of interpreting a regulation, 
to create de facto a new regulation.”62 Nor was the FCC’s position a post-hoc 
response to litigation or otherwise not the product of the agency’s “fair and 
considered judgment.”63 By elaborating the many things the FCC’s amicus 
position was not, the Court granted Auer deference to the FCC while clearly 
signaling that Auer is not a blank check for agencies. 
Justice Scalia’s Talk America concurrence was the first time that one of 
the Justices announced an interest in reconsidering Auer. While Justice Scalia 
considered the FCC’s interpretation to be the better reading of the regulation, 
he took issue with the majority’s reasoning and declared that he was 
“increasingly doubtful of [Auer’s] validity.”64 He called Auer “contrary to 
fundamental principles of separation of powers” for uniting legislative and 
executive power in one body, and warned against the risk to liberty, “lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner.”65 Auer promotes arbitrary government, he argued, by 
encouraging vague rulemaking and post hoc interpretations to fit the agency’s 
application of the moment. He conclusively announced that when asked to 
reconsider Auer, he “will be receptive to doing so.”66 
A year later, the majority in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. 
cited Justice Scalia’s words approvingly, and narrowed Auer to preclude 
deference when the agency changes its interpretation to create unfair surprise 
with potentially massive liability for regulated parties.67 In Christopher, the 
Court considered the meaning of a regulation by the Department of Labor that 
covered certain obligations under the Fair Labor Standards Act.68 The Court 
rejected the DOL’s interpretation set forth in its amicus brief because of notice 
problems, created when “the agency announces its interpretation for the first 
time in an enforcement proceeding and demands deference.”69 The majority 
left Auer on shaky footing, warning that Auer “creates a risk that agencies will 
promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they can later interpret as 
they see fit,” thereby undermining rulemaking’s notice and predictability 
                                                                                                                     
 61 Id. at 2260, 2262. 
 62 Id. at 2263. 
 63 Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 64 Id. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 65 Id. (quoting MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, 151–52 (O. Piest ed., 
T. Nugent trans. 1949) (1749)). 
 66 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2265–66. 
 67 Christopher v. SmitchKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167–68 (2012). 
 68 Id. at 2161. 
 69 Id. at 2168. 
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goals.70 “[W]hatever the general merits of Auer deference,” the Court 
concluded, “it is unwarranted here.”71 
Christopher was the culmination of a series of recent decisions that limited 
Auer and precluded deference when the regulation parrots the statutory 
language72 or is unambiguous.73 These decisions added to Auer’s traditional 
boundaries, according to which courts will not defer to interpretations that are 
post hoc rationalizations, do not “reflect the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment,” or are otherwise “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”74 Some observers thought Christopher might be the Court’s 
opportunity to overrule Auer altogether,75 but it continued on the more 
moderate path of narrowing and limiting Auer. Reconsidering Auer would 
await another day. 
By 2013, Justice Scalia had two more supporters on the Court. In Decker 
v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito indicated their willingness to reconsider Auer, but declined to do so 
because the issue, “a basic one going to the heart of administrative law,” had 
not been briefed.76 In Decker, the Court deferred to the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s amicus brief interpreting its own ambiguous regulation.77 
As in Talk America, the Court reiterated Auer’s boundaries, emphasizing 
situations in which courts can refuse to grant Auer deference.78 The Court 
concluded, however, that the agency’s “consistent” interpretation was 
“rational” and “permissible,” with the regulatory language “lend[ing] support” 
to the EPA’s interpretation.79 
Justice Scalia responded with a scathing dissent that focused on Auer’s 
implications for the separation of powers. Calling Auer “a dangerous 
permission slip for the arrogation of power,” he compared it to the evil that 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Id. 
 71 Id.  
 72 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
 73 While this has arguably long been a limit of Auer deference, because a court would 
reject a contrary interpretation of an unambiguous regulation as “clearly erroneous,” this 
limit was articulated in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). See also 
Angstreich, supra note 11, at 70–71 (arguing that Auer deference, while formally stated as 
a one-step test, implicitly involves a preliminary step to determine whether the regulation is 
unambiguous). 
 74 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 75 See Amanda Frost, Academic Round-Up, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2012, 12:27 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/academic-round-up-83/ [http://perma.cc/U4YZ-LS9H]. 
 76 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 77 Id. at 1331 (majority opinion). 
 78 Id. at 1337–38 (reiterating that deference is inappropriate for “post hoc 
justification[s] adopted in response to litigation” or “change[s] from prior practice” (first 
alteration in original)).  
 79 Id. at 1337–38. 
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Blackstone condemned of “resolving doubts about ‘the construction of the 
Roman laws’ by ‘stat[ing] the case to the emperor in writing, and tak[ing] his 
opinion upon it.’”80 In his dissent, Justice Scalia sought to bring another 
Justice on board, quoting Justice Thomas’s dissent in Thomas Jefferson 
University v. Shalala that acknowledged Auer’s incentives for agencies to 
issue vague regulations that undermine notice to regulated parties.81 The 
principal wrong behind Auer, Justice Scalia concluded, is that it “contravenes 
one of the great rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not 
adjudge its violation.”82 
Most recently, this Term in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Justice 
Thomas joined Auer’s critics in calling to revisit the doctrine.83 While the 
majority found it unnecessary to reach the Auer question,84 Justices Alito, 
Scalia, and Thomas filed separate concurring opinions emphasizing their 
desire to reconsider Auer.85 This time, Justice Scalia focused on the 
Administrative Procedure Act, while Justice Thomas’s thirteen-page 
concurrence made the historical case against Auer based on its implications for 
the separation of powers and checks and balances.86 
A number of recent petitions for certiorari have invited the Court to 
reconsider Auer, but it has yet to take a case that directly presents that 
question.87 With four Justices on record wanting to revisit Auer, it is only a 
matter of time. As Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito noted in Decker, 
“[t]he bar is now aware that there is some interest” in reconsidering Auer, and 
they will “await a case in which the issue is properly raised and argued.”88 If 
and when the Court reconsiders Auer, it will be asked to weigh Auer’s dangers 
against its benefits, to decide whether the risks to the separation of powers and 
agency incentives outweigh the pragmatic needs of regulatory agencies. To 
help the Court in that calculus, this Article asks how the federal courts of 
                                                                                                                     
 80 Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in 
original) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 58 
(1765)). 
 81 Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting)). 
 82 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342. 
 83 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 84 Id. at 1208 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 85 Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 
1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
 86 Id. at 1213–25. 
 87 See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 610 (9th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 948, and cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 950 (2015); Rivera v. 
Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 
(2014). 
 88 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
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appeals have used Auer since Talk America, when members of the Court 
began questioning Auer deference. 
III. VIEW FROM THE GROUND: AUER IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
A. Methodology 
To create the data set for this Article, I collected all decisions (351 total) 
by courts of appeals decided since Talk America that cite a major decision in 
the Court’s Auer jurisprudence, including Auer v. Robbins (173 cases),89 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (18 additional cases),90 Thomas 
Jefferson University v. Shalala (29 additional cases),91 Gonzales v. Oregon (30 
additional cases),92 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation 
Council (3 additional cases),93 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone 
Co. (8 additional cases),94 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. (19 
additional cases),95 Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (9 
additional cases),96 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke (11 additional 
cases),97 and Christensen v. Harris County (51 additional cases).98 
I eliminated cases that cite the referenced decisions for unrelated 
propositions,99 resulting in a data set of 190 cases. These decisions thus 
comprise three full populations of Auer cases by courts of appeals: (1) 62 
cases decided between Talk America and Christopher; (2) 43 cases decided 
between Christopher and Decker; and (3) 85 cases decided between Decker 
and December 2014.100 These time periods are significant because Talk 
America was the first time a Justice signaled an interest in revisiting Auer,101 
Christopher imposed a major new limitation on Auer,102 and Decker added 
                                                                                                                     
 89 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 452 (1997). 
 90 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 412 (1945). 
 91 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 506 (1994). 
 92 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 248 (2006). 
 93 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 265 (2009). 
 94 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2257 (2011). 
 95 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012). 
 96 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1330 (2013). 
 97 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 161 (2007). 
 98 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 578 (2000). 
 99 For example, some cases cite Auer as a point of contrast when applying Chevron 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, while others cite the cases for 
propositions of employment or environmental law. 
 100 The data set does not include cases in which courts did not cite a major Auer 
decision but where Auer deference was arguably appropriate. Thus, while the data set 
likely is not the population of all cases in which a court confronted an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation, it is the population of cases in which a court directly 
considered the applicability of Auer deference under the Court’s controlling jurisprudence. 
 101 See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 102 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012). 
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two new Justices interested in reconsidering the doctrine.103 Together, the 
cases show how Auer has been used since Talk America, and separately they 
show how Auer deference has changed as the Court’s skepticism has grown. 
Because this is the population of Auer cases following Talk America and the 
analysis is intended to show how courts have used Auer since then, the 
majority of results, such as the percentage of courts granting Auer deference 
during different periods, does not require statistical significance testing.104 
Where significance testing might be helpful, however, it is included in the 
analysis. 
The data set also includes information about the types of cases in which 
courts of appeals grant Auer deference, including factors that could reasonably 
be expected to influence the level of deference afforded to the agency’s 
interpretation.105 These include the date, circuit, agency, political party of the 
presidents who appointed the majority of panel judges,106 whether the agency 
was party to the litigation, and the form of agency interpretation at issue. 
Agency interpretations came in party briefs, amicus briefs, public issuances, 
private communications, administrative court decisions, and agency orders. 
Finally, the data set identifies the rationale behind courts’ decisions to 
grant or withhold Auer deference. Courts that deferred to the agency adopted 
one of three positions: (1) reluctant deference, where the court clearly 
indicated that but for Auer it would reject the agency’s interpretation; (2) 
expedient deference, where courts ranged from offering little discussion to 
identifying regulatory ambiguity and the reasonableness of the agency’s 
discretionary choice; or (3) confirmation deference, where the court clearly 
considered the agency’s position to be the best reading of the regulation. In 
contrast, courts that refused to defer relied on one of four rationales to reject 
the agency’s interpretation: (1) it was plainly erroneous, inconsistent with the 
regulation, or not the product of the agency’s fair and considered judgment; 
(2) it would impose unfair surprise on regulated parties; (3) the regulation 
parroted the statutory language; or (4) the regulation was unambiguous. 
                                                                                                                     
 103 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring).  
 104 See Allen Rubin, Significance Testing with Population Data, 59 SOC. SERV. REV. 
518, 518 (1985). 
 105 The data set points towards the existence of a relationship between Auer deference 
and various factors, but I do not attempt to prove it. There are too many relevant variables 
to prove causation with a population of this size. With this data, I hope instead to show 
how Auer deference has varied across factors, to show what has happened in the post-Talk 
America period without here drawing conclusions about whether, for example, certain 
agencies are more likely to receive deference in future cases. 
 106 While this is admittedly an imperfect measure of a judge’s political disposition, it 
provides an objective indicator of political ideology and is consistent with the methodology 
used in an earlier study, thereby facilitating comparison. See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 
13, at 521–23. 
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B. What the Court Has Already Accomplished by Narrowing Auer 
The first insight from the data is that the Court has already accomplished a 
lot by narrowing Auer without overruling it. The data show that Auer 
deference has changed significantly since Talk America, when Justice Scalia 
first signaled his growing discontent with the doctrine.107 Since then, courts of 
appeals have become less willing to grant Auer deference, and there is no 
evidence that political ideology has driven the change. Rather, the rate at 
which courts grant Auer deference has fallen among judges appointed by 
Republican presidents and Democratic presidents. 
Lesson 1: The rate at which courts grant Auer deference has fallen  
since Talk America. 
Courts of appeals have responded to the Court’s recent Auer decisions by 
narrowing their application of the doctrine. While no court of appeals has 
refused to follow Auer since Talk America—Auer remains good law, and 
courts treat it as such—many have accepted the Court’s invitation to withhold 
deference when they consider it inappropriate. Accordingly, the rate at which 
courts grant Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation 
has steadily declined since Talk America. 
Between the Court’s decisions in Talk America and Christopher, courts of 
appeals granted Auer deference at a rate of 82.3%. That rate dropped to 74.4% 
during the period between Christopher and Decker, and fell further to 70.6% 
since Decker. Even if the data is considered a sample of the true population, 
there was a statistically significant decline from 2011 to 2014 in the rate at 
which courts of appeals grant Auer deference.108 In sum, Auer is no longer the 
extreme form of deference it was once considered to be.109 
                                                                                                                     
 107 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 108 Because the data set includes the full population of cases in which courts directly 
considered the Auer question, it is unnecessary to test the statistical significance of this 
proposition. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Even assuming, however, that the 
data set is a sample that excludes cases in which the court considered but did not cite Auer 
or related cases, there is a statistically significant difference in the level of deference during 
the first and third time periods. Using a Bernoulli one-tailed t-test, the difference is 
significant with a p-value of less than 0.05. 
 109 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 18, at 1098, 1101. 
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Table 1: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Time Period 
Time Period % Granting Auer Deference Total Cases 
Decided Between Talk 
America and Christopher 82.3% 62 
Decided Between 
Christopher and Decker 74.4% 43 
Decided Since Decker 70.6% 85 
Lesson 2: Political ideology has not driven the change in Auer deference. 
Given that anti-Auer rhetoric is coming exclusively from more 
conservative Justices on the Court, it might be expected that judges appointed 
by Republican presidents could be more receptive to withholding Auer 
deference than their Democratic-appointed counterparts—particularly because 
all cases in the data set involve an agency’s interpretation offered under a 
Democratic administration. There is no evidence, however, that political 
ideology has driven the decline in Auer deference over time. Looking at the 
majority composition of each panel, there is little correlation between political 
ideology and change in Auer deference between 2011 and 2014. Rather, 
deference has fallen among panels with a majority of judges appointed by both 
Republican and Democratic presidents.110 The small number of Auer cases 
(43) decided between Christopher and Decker likely explains the disparity 
during that period.111 
                                                                                                                     
 110 This is consistent with the findings of an earlier study that looked at Auer deference 
before Talk America. See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 13, at 515–16, 519–20. 
 111 N=20 for majority-Democratic panels and N=23 for majority-Republican panels 
during the period between Christopher and Decker.  
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Figure 1: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Panel Political Composition 
 
C. When Courts of Appeals Grant or Reject Auer 
The data also reveal information about when courts of appeals grant Auer 
deference. While the population size is too small to provide meaningful 
information about the details of how Auer deference changed from 2011 to 
2014, the aggregate results reveal the role Auer has played since Talk America. 
The data show how deference rates vary by circuit, agency, the agency’s 
participation in the litigation, the form of interpretation at issue, and the 
political disposition of the deciding panel. While the analysis does not attempt 
to show which of these variables cause agencies to defer more or less often,112 
it does offer insights into the types of variation that exist in how courts 
currently apply Auer. 
Lesson 3: Circuits vary in their application of Auer. 
The data reveal distinct variation by circuit, with some circuits granting 
Auer deference more often than others. In contrast to the political disposition 
of the Justices on the Court calling to revisit Auer, the most historically 
conservative courts of appeals grant Auer deference at the highest rates. The 
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits readily granted Auer deference at a rate of 
91%, in stark contrast to the historically liberal Ninth Circuit’s rate of just 
72%. This may be explained simply by the rarity of cases.113 Interestingly, the 
                                                                                                                     
 112 See supra note 105. 
 113 Indeed, this is the opposite of what would be expected. See Cass R. Sunstein & 
Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2194 (2008). The 
relatively small number of cases and variation in factors other than political ideology likely 
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D.C. Circuit, known as a leader in administrative law, applied Auer at one of 
the lowest rates—just 65%. 
Table 2: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Circuit 
Circuit % Granting Auer Deference Total Cases 
Fifth 92% 13 
Eighth 90% 10 
Eleventh 89% 9 
First 86% 7 
Sixth 85% 13 
Tenth 82% 11 
Federal 77% 13 
Second 73% 15 
Ninth 72% 36 
Third 71% 14 
Fourth 70% 10 
District of Columbia 65% 31 
Seventh 50% 8 
Total 75% 190 
Lesson 4: Courts defer to some agencies more than others, and some agencies 
use Auer more than others. 
There are also variations in how often different agencies invoke Auer, and 
which receive it most often when they do. Auer arises most often in cases 
involving the Department of Labor and the Bureau of Immigration Affairs. 
Interestingly, courts also defer to those agencies least often, granting Auer 
deference in 62% and 61% of cases respectively. The Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) also frequently invoke Auer.114 Courts are 
highly deferential to HHS, deferring 88% of the time, while DOJ and EPA fall 
in the middle, with deference rates of 75% and 71% respectively.115 It is 
difficult to generalize about other agencies given the rarity of cases, but 
Table 3 displays the deference rates for all agencies. 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See infra Table 3. 
 115 Id.  
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Table 3: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Agency 
Agency % Granting Auer Deference Total Cases 
Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) 100% 9 
Department of Housing & Urban 
Development (HUD) 100% 3 
Sentencing Commission 100% 4 
Department of Transportation (DOT) 100% 6 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) 100% 6 
Department of Health & Human 
Services (HHS) 88% 17 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 86% 7 
Department of Education (DOE) 83% 6 
Military-Related 83% 6 
Department of the Interior  83% 6 
Department of Justice (DOJ) 73% 11 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) 71% 14 
Social Security Administration (SSA) 71% 7 
Department of Commerce (DOC) 67% 3 
Defense-Related† 67% 6 
Energy-Related‡ 67% 9 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 67% 6 
Department of the Treasury 67% 3 
Other§ 63% 8 
Labor-Related 62% 26 
Bureau of Immigration Affairs (BIA) 61% 23 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) 50% 4 
  Army Corps of Engineers, Coast Guard, National Guard Bureau, and Merit System 
Protection Board 
 † Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense 
 ‡ Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) 
 § Patent Board, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), State Department, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
Federal Reserve, and Bureau of Indian Affairs 
 Department of Labor (DOL), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
and Railroad Retirement Board 
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Lesson 5: Courts defer more often when the agency is party to the litigation, 
but not when the agency’s interpretation simply appears in its party brief. 
Courts often apply Auer deference when reviewing an agency’s order or 
an administrative court decision. In such cases, the agency is party to the 
litigation, and the court can readily ask the agency its views on a regulation’s 
meaning. Courts defer more often to the agency in these cases, deferring at a 
rate of 86%. 
Table 4: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Party to Litigation 
 % Granting 
Auer Deference Total Cases 
Agency Is Party 86% 147 
Agency Is Not Party 72% 43 
 
This does not mean, however, that courts readily defer to the agency’s 
views when they are simply expressed in a brief tailored to the litigation at 
hand—whether the agency appears as a party or amicus. Rather, courts defer 
less often to the agency when its interpretation is in its party or amicus 
brief.116 In contrast, Table 5 shows that courts defer most often when the 
interpretation takes a more formal format, whether contained in the agency’s 
order to a regulated party, or in a public issuance that gives the public a high 
degree of notice regarding the agency’s position. 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 
is illustrative of how courts often reject an agency’s interpretation expressed in 
its party brief.117 The court began by conceding that Auer applies to an 
agency’s legal brief just as it does to other forms of interpretation.118 It 
rejected the agency’s position as “unpersuasive,” however, because even if the 
regulation were ambiguous, the agency’s litigating position conflicted with its 
earlier position.119 That inconsistency led the court to conclude the agency’s 
brief was not the product of its “fair and considered judgment,” but rather a 
“convenient litigating position” that was nothing “other than a creature of this 
proceeding—where it is ‘a party to this case.’”120 Other courts spend little time 
dwelling on the significance of the form of interpretation when rejecting the 
agency’s position. For example, in Schwab v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that it was rejecting the “interpretation the Commissioner 
                                                                                                                     
 116 See infra Table 5. 
 117 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 
2013). 
 118 Id. at 1137. 
 119 Id. at 1137–39. 
 120 Id. at 1138–39 (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 
(2011)). 
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advances in his briefs,” but reasoned simply that it conflicted with the 
unambiguous text of the regulation.121 
While the Court’s recent Auer cases all involve deference to an agency’s 
amicus brief, agency interpretations take a variety of forms and Auer arises far 
more often in non-amicus situations. Auer most commonly arises when the 
agency is party to the litigation and the court is asked to review the agency’s 
enforcement or adjudicative decision.122 In such cases, the court considers 
whether to defer to the agency’s interpretation contained in its enforcement 
order or in the decision of an administrative court. The next most common 
application of Auer is to the agency’s public issuances, such as opinion letters 
or other public statements that offer regulatory interpretations.123 Courts are 
rarely asked simply to defer to the agency’s party or amicus brief. 
Table 5: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Form of Interpretation 
Form of Interpretation % Granting  Auer Deference Total Cases
 
Agency Order 85% 52 
Public Issuance 80% 50 
Amicus Brief 76% 25 
Administrative Court Decision 64% 47 
Party Brief 59% 17 
Private Communications  0% 1 
  Two courts relied on multiple forms of interpretation. 
Lesson 6: There is little evidence that political ideology plays a role. 
The aggregate data, like the trend data, suggest that a judge’s willingness 
to grant Auer deference typically does not fall along traditional political lines. 
Panels with a majority of judges appointed by Democratic presidents defer 
slightly less often (71%) than panels with a majority of judges appointed by 
Republican presidents (79%). Combined with what we know about the change 
in deference over time by the panel’s political composition,124 the data suggest 
political ideology plays a minimal role in Auer deference.125 
                                                                                                                     
 121 Schwab v. Comm’r, 715 F.3d 1169, 1176–77 n.11 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 122 See infra Table 5. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See supra Figure 1. 
 125 This is consistent with the findings of an earlier study that looked at Auer deference 
before Talk America. See Pierce & Weiss, supra note 13, at 519–20. 
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Table 6: Auer Deference Since Talk America by Panel Political Ideology 
Political Ideology % Granting Auer Deference Total Cases 
Majority Democrat 71% 91 
Majority Republican 79% 99 
D. Why Courts of Appeals Grant or Reject Auer 
In addition to revealing when courts of appeals most often grant Auer 
deference, the data also reveal why courts do or do not defer. This information 
is primarily helpful for two reasons. First, it illuminates whether Auer truly 
compels courts to adopt regulatory interpretations they find unconvincing—a 
central, underlying concern for Auer’s critics. Second, it shows which of 
Auer’s limits courts have used most often when withholding deference, 
illustrating their capacity to reject unreasonable interpretations. The results 
show that, along with Auer’s general decline, courts have begun to turn the 
doctrine into a generic framework to evaluate the reasonableness of an 
agency’s position. 
Lesson 7: When courts defer, they rarely do so reluctantly. 
Not all courts use Auer in the same way. Some cite Auer to bolster their 
own conclusions, while others use Auer as the sole basis for their decisions. 
Courts of appeals adopt a range of approaches to agency interpretations that 
span from reluctant to enthusiastic. Those that granted Auer deference adopted 
one of three approaches to embrace the agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation: (1) reluctant deference; (2) expedient deference; or (3) 
confirmation deference. 
First, some deference is clearly reluctant. In such a case, the court 
indicates that but for Auer, it would reject the agency’s proffered 
interpretation. Some consider all true “deference” to be reluctant, in the sense 
that the court would have reached a different conclusion but for the agency’s 
interpretation—otherwise the court is not “deferring” to the agency, it is just 
agreeing with it.126 For Auer’s critics, this is the most worrisome type of 
deference, because it compels courts to accept what they clearly believe is not 
the best interpretation. Since Talk America, only one court of appeals has 
granted Auer deference while clearly indicating it disagreed with the agency’s 
                                                                                                                     
 126 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 
(2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To defer is to subordinate one’s own judgment to 
another’s. If one has been persuaded by another, so that one’s judgment accords with the 
other’s, there is no room for deferral—only for agreement.”); Scott H. Angstreich & 
Cynthia Barmore, Regulated Firms, Auer, Skidmore, and Court-Invited Amicus Briefs, 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2015, at 13, 13 (2015); Healy, supra note 12, at 647–48. 
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interpretation. In that case, Qwest Corp. v. Colorado Public Utilities 
Commission, the Tenth Circuit reluctantly deferred to the FCC’s amicus brief, 
declaring it “would not necessarily reach the same result if not required to 
defer.”127 
More commonly, courts use deference as a shortcut in their reasoning.128 
In these cases, Auer is an expedient form of deference, and courts use Auer in 
a range of ways to streamline their analyses. This type of deference accounts 
for 78% of decisions granting Auer deference. At one end of the spectrum, 
courts invoke Auer as a shortcut, simply citing Auer and engaging in little 
analysis of the regulation. In one case, for example, the Third Circuit accepted 
the agency’s interpretation in a single sentence to quickly reject a federal 
prisoner’s argument.129 In the middle of the spectrum, the court examines the 
regulatory ambiguity but quickly concludes that Auer’s exceptions do not 
apply. For example, the Ninth Circuit granted Auer deference to the 
Department of Labor by reasoning that “[i]n the face of regulatory ambiguity, 
the DOL’s determination . . . was reasonable” and there was “no indication” of 
“unfair surprise.”130 “Therefore,” the court concluded, “we defer to the DOL’s 
interpretation.”131 At the other end of the spectrum, courts conclude that the 
regulation leaves a discretionary question of policy unanswered, and they 
defer to the agency’s reasonable choice. This type of reasoning usually 
involves extensive regulatory analysis to find the regulation ambiguous, and 
the court concludes that the agency is best suited to resolve the policy question 
at issue. For example, the Seventh Circuit adopted an interpretation by the 
EPA because it was an “eminently reasonable way to balance . . . competing 
interests.”132 
Finally, some deference is not really “deference” at all.133 While less 
common,134 some courts use Auer as an additional reason for the result but 
                                                                                                                     
 127 Qwest Corp. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 656 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 128 See Angstreich & Barmore, supra note 126, at 13 (“[C]ourts of appeals often apply 
Auer simply as a shortcut to a result the court would have reached on its own, without 
giving any additional weight to the agency’s view.”). 
 129 See Patel v. Zenk, 447 Fed. App’x 337, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The BOP acted 
within its authority in interpreting Code 108, and Patel has not shown that its interpretation 
that a cell phone constitutes a ‘hazardous tool’ is ‘plainly erroneous’ or ‘inconsistent’ with 
Code 108.” (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))). 
 130 Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth 
Circuit similarly accepted an interpretation offered in an invited amicus brief, reasoning 
there was no indication it was anything other than the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment. Andersen v. DHL Ret. Pension Plan, 766 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“Insofar as the government’s brief interprets [the regulation], we defer to it.”). 
 131 Rivera, 735 F.3d at 899. 
 132 United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 133 See Angstreich & Barmore, supra note 126, at 13 (“In a sense, all deference by an 
appellate court to an agency’s interpretation is reluctant. If the court would have come to 
the same conclusion on its own—or without according the agency’s view any special 
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clearly indicate that the agency’s reading is the best interpretation of the 
regulation. This form of deference accounts for 20% of decisions granting 
Auer deference. The First Circuit’s decision in Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans 
Servicing is illustrative.135 After the court deferred to the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Affairs, it stressed that “Auer deference is not necessary to 
our conclusion.”136 Rather, the court reasoned that the agency’s interpretation 
“was persuasive of its own force,” and concluded it “would agree with the 
United States’ interpretation even if we gave it no deference at all.”137 In these 
cases, Auer is often treated as an afterthought, cited to supplement the court’s 
own conclusion. 
Table 7: Reasons for Granting Auer Deference Since Talk America 
Reason % of Grants Total Cases 
Expedient Deference 78% 112 
Confirmation Deference† 20% 30 
Reluctant Deference‡ 1% 1 
  The court ranges from offering little discussion to concluding the agency’s position is 
a highly reasonable exercise of discretion. 
 † The court clearly indicates the agency’s interpretation is the best reading. 
 ‡ The court clearly indicates that, but for Auer, it would reject the agency’s 
interpretation.
Lesson 8: When courts refuse to defer, they most often rely on Auer’s 
traditional boundaries. 
As the Court rolled back Auer in recent years, it offered courts a variety of 
new tools to reject an agency’s inappropriate interpretation of its own 
regulation. For instance, Auer no longer applies if the agency’s interpretation 
causes unfair surprise,138 or if the regulation parrots the statutory language139 
                                                                                                                     
weight because it is the agency’s view (as opposed to the argument of a private party)— 
‘deference’ is not dictating the outcome.”). 
 134 Because the data set includes the full population of cases in which courts directly 
considered the Auer question, it is unnecessary to test the statistical significance of this 
proposition. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Even assuming, however, that the 
data set is a sample that excludes cases in which the court considered but neglected to cite 
Auer or related cases, there is a statistically significant difference between the prevalence 
of expedient deference and confirmation deference. Using a Bernoulli two-tailed t-test, the 
difference is significant with a p-value of less than 0.01. 
 135 See Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738 F.3d 432, 453 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167–68 (2012). 
 139 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
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or is unambiguous.140 While courts have rejected Auer more frequently since 
those decisions, they still rely on Auer’s traditional limitations more often than 
the Court’s recently created ones.141 Most courts that refuse to grant Auer 
deference reason that the agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous, 
inconsistent with the regulation, or not the product of the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment. Similarly, about a third of courts find the regulation 
unambiguous, a limit that the Court articulated in Christensen v. Harris 
County but that has long been considered a boundary on Auer deference.142 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S. Attorney General 
is illustrative of the reasoning courts typically use when withholding Auer 
deference.143 There, the court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) did not have power to make de novo factual findings.144 The BIA 
argued that its regulation—which forbid its “de novo review of findings of fact 
determined by an immigration judge”—nevertheless allowed the BIA to 
review an asylum applicant’s likelihood of being tortured de novo, because 
that presented a mixed question of fact and law for removal.145 In refusing to 
give Auer deference to the administrative court’s precedential decisions as 
“plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulation’s unambiguous and 
obvious meaning,” the court looked to the language of the regulation and the 
Attorney General’s explanatory comments, analogizing to torts, contracts, and 
immigration cases, and relying on the reasoning of other courts of appeals.146 
In short, the court was unconvinced that the agency was right, and it rejected 
the agency’s interpretation by using common tools of judicial analysis and 
review. 
                                                                                                                     
 140 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). 
 141 Because the data set includes the full population of cases in which courts directly 
considered the Auer question, it is unnecessary to test the statistical significance of this 
proposition. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Even assuming, however, that the 
data set is a sample that excludes cases in which the court considered but neglected to cite 
Auer or related cases, there is a statistically significant difference between the prevalence 
of the first and second rationale in Table 8. Using a Bernoulli two-tailed t-test, the 
difference is significant with a p-value of less than 0.05. 
 142 See supra note 73. 
 143 See Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 703 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 1308–09. 
 146 Id. at 1309–14. 
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Table 8: Reasons for Withholding Auer Deference Since Talk America 
Reason % of Refusals Total Cases 
1. Plainly erroneous, inconsistent with 
the regulation, or not the product of 
fair and considered judgment 
66% 31 
2. Unambiguous regulation 32% 15 
3. Parroting language 9% 4 
4. Unfair surprise 6% 3 
  Some decisions cite multiple reasons. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REVISITING AUER 
The data provide a window into what Auer means in practice. It is not an 
everyday aspect of administrative law147—perhaps agency regulations are 
seldom ambiguous—but it is an important tool for courts tasked with 
interpreting agency regulations. When deciding whether to overrule a staple of 
administrative law, it is worth first asking the size of the problem to be solved, 
and then comparing it to the costs of the solution proposed. This Part considers 
those two questions. The data suggest that there would be little benefit to 
overruling Auer, while the costs of replacing it with a different deference 
regime would be significant. 
A. The Size of the Problem: Thinking About Auer’s Practicalities 
Critics of Auer deference primarily worry about incentives: incentives for 
agencies to draft vague regulations, to interpret unclear rules unfairly against 
regulated parties, and to maximize their power in ways that structural 
guarantees in the Constitution are designed to prevent through the separation 
of powers and checks and balances. While the data do not shed light directly 
on the actions of agencies—whether the clarity of their regulations have 
increased or decreased with Auer’s decline, or how agencies have otherwise 
responded to Talk America, Christopher, and Decker148—it does offer some 
insights into whether courts use Auer in problematic or benign ways. 
First, the most worrisome type of Auer deference is rare, and there is every 
reason to think it will only become rarer with time. The fundamental concern 
                                                                                                                     
 147 For comparison, courts of appeals cited Auer 173 times and Chevron 762 times 
during the period studied. 
 148 While these questions are beyond the scope of this Article, it would be worthwhile 
for researchers to interview rulemaking officials and explore whether Auer has incentivized 
them to adopt vague regulations. A new study by Chris Walker suggests that at least some 
agency officials view their interests as better served by writing clear rules for regulated 
entities to follow. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 999, 1065–66 (2015). 
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about Auer is that it compels courts to accept bad interpretations offered by the 
agency. Since Talk America, however, only one court clearly indicated that 
Auer compelled it to adopt what it considered to be a worse interpretation of a 
regulation, but one that was still within Auer’s bounds. As courts increasingly 
withhold Auer deference, their growing willingness to find the agency’s 
interpretation “plainly erroneous” may eventually render extinct courts’ 
acceptance of ill-reasoned agency interpretations. 
There are two likely explanations for the rarity of overtly reluctant 
deference. The first is simple: agencies often offer reasonable, well thought-
out interpretations of their regulations, and courts may be content to defer 
because they would reach the same conclusion as the agency. Even when 
courts do not decisively indicate that the agency’s interpretation is the best 
one, their reasoning often reflects that impression when they grant Auer 
deference. Many of the cases in the data set that are labeled “expedient 
deference” would likely fall into the category of “confirmation deference” if 
the court were forced to engage in more lengthy regulatory analysis. For 
example, in one case the D.C. Circuit described an interpretation offered by 
the Drug Enforcement Administration as “eminently reasonable,” and 
reasoned it could find “nothing in the record that could move” it to hold 
against the agency.149 Similar examples abound.150 In these cases, Auer is not 
imposing a cost by requiring the court to reach a worse outcome, but rather is 
lightening the court’s burden and facilitating judicial review. 
The second explanation for the rarity of reluctant deference is that the 
Court’s recent Auer jurisprudence has given lower courts a variety of tools to 
reject interpretations that they consider unreasonable. Courts of appeals may 
have picked up on some Justices’ skepticism of Auer, as suggested by Auer’s 
decline from 2011 to 2014. As courts become more aware of Auer’s pitfalls, 
they may be more willing to apply Auer’s traditional boundaries in ways that 
resemble a test for reasonableness, as they do for an agency’s interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute under Chevron.151 When courts refuse to defer because 
the regulation is plainly erroneous, the analysis often looks like just that. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stephens v. U.S. Railroad Retirement 
Board is illustrative.152 In that case, the court reviewed a decision by the U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
 149 Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 150 See, e.g., Kutty v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 764 F.3d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 2014) (“This 
court must give the DOL’s interpretation of its own regulation ‘controlling weight unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ which it clearly is not.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Elaine’s Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 106 F.3d 726, 729 
(6th Cir. 1997))); O’Bryan v. McDonald, 771 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]his 
interpretation is not ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ In fact, the 
interpretation is reasonable. It makes sense for the VA to interpret ‘defect’ . . . [as it did].” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Thun v. Shinseki, 572 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009))). 
 151 Under Chevron, courts ask whether the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute is a “permissible” or “reasonable” construction. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 866 (1984). 
 152 See Stephens v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 704 F.3d 587, 590–91 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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Railroad Retirement Board, an administrative court, denying an application for 
benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act.153 The Board had interpreted its 
regulations to hold that the petitioner’s work history precluded his ability to 
recover benefits.154 The regulations provided that certain monthly earnings 
will “ordinarily” disqualify an applicant from receiving benefits, but the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the regulation’s “plain language” prevented the Board 
from exclusively relying on the applicant’s earnings history to reject his 
claim.155 Over a lengthy dissent,156 the court reasoned that the Board’s 
decision was contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent and the remedial purposes of 
similar legislation, and highlighted the petitioner’s medical evidence, 
education, and work history that supported his claim.157 
Thus, Auer’s limits already allow courts to avoid problematic outcomes 
and reject agency interpretations that they consider unreasonable. As Auer’s 
strength declines, courts are using its limits to focus on the reasonableness of 
an agency’s interpretation, in ways that resemble Chevron deference in 
application. Courts have proven willing and able to reject unreasonable 
interpretations of regulations, particularly when offered in informal formats 
that suggest less reason to defer.158 While courts do defer more often to an 
agency when that agency is party to the litigation, those courts are not simply 
deferring to the agency’s party brief. Rather, Table 5 shows that courts defer 
least often when asked to defer to the agency’s party brief. Courts are similarly 
skeptical of interpretations made by administrative courts and embrace a more 
traditional role of appellate review. These variations suggest courts already are 
weighing carefully the reasonableness of an agency’s proffered interpretation, 
and rejecting it when it is unreasonable. 
The data suggest that Auer’s role in the wake of Talk America has been 
relatively benign. A central worry among Auer’s critics is that agencies will 
insulate their policies from judicial review by offering ad hoc interpretations 
of vague regulations in response to litigation, but courts already have—and 
use—a variety of tools to reject such interpretations. While Auer may entail 
other costs in terms of agency decision-making and incentives, today it does 
not bind courts to accept unreasonable agency positions. The size of the 
problem to be solved does not appear that great. 
                                                                                                                     
 153 Id. at 588. 
 154 Id. at 589. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 591–95 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing substantial evidence supported the 
Board’s conclusions). 
 157 Id. at 590–91 (majority opinion). 
 158 See Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that 
interpretations contained in opinion letters and other informal formats are not entitled to 
Chevron deference). 
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B. The Costs of the Solution: Skidmore as an Alternative to Auer 
To be sure, Auer’s full costs may be higher than the data reveal given 
potential incentives for agency behavior, and it is worth considering the costs 
of replacing Auer with a less deferential regime. After all, if there is a better 
alternative to Auer, the Court could easily avoid the risks associated with the 
status quo. Among critics asking the Court to overrule Auer, a common 
suggestion is to replace it with Skidmore deference.159 Under Skidmore, a 
court will defer to an agency’s opinion if the court considers it persuasive.160 
Skidmore urges courts to accept an agency’s view as a “body of experience 
and informed judgment” that offers a source of “guidance,” depending on the 
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”161 If the Court were to 
overrule Auer, replacing it with Skidmore would be a natural choice; courts 
already apply Skidmore deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
regulation if they withhold Auer deference.162 
Replacing Auer with Skidmore, however, would not be without cost. 
Skidmore’s greatest flaw is its unpredictability, and substituting it for Auer 
would likely entail a major loss in predictability for regulated parties.163 Even 
Justice Scalia, Auer’s greatest critic, has recognized that Skidmore deference is 
“incoherent, both linguistically and practically,” and “does nothing but 
confuse.”164 Skidmore’s current formulation involves so many factors—“the 
degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, 
and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position”—that it largely resembles 
the totality of the circumstances test “most feared by litigants who want to 
know what to expect.”165 
Skidmore urges deference when the agency’s interpretation has power to 
persuade, but there is little consistency in how courts apply that standard, or in 
the factors they find persuasive. For example, one study found that 19% of 
                                                                                                                     
 159 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 12, at 679–93; Manning, supra note 11, at 681. 
 160 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168–69 (2012) 
(applying Skidmore deference after holding that Auer deference was unwarranted). 
 163 See Angstreich, supra note 11, at 85, 117–18 (arguing that determining “[e]xactly 
what Skidmore entails as a standard of deference to an agency is difficult” and eliminating 
Auer would reduce incentives for regulated entities to identify ambiguities during notice 
and comment). But see Manning, supra note 11, at 694–96 (arguing that while replacing 
Auer with Skidmore would create more uncertainty when there is a clear interpretation of a 
vague regulation, net clarity under Skidmore would be greater because agencies would 
draft clearer regulations). 
 164 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 
(2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 165 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (quoting majority opinion at 228). 
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courts of appeals apply an “independent judgment model” to Skidmore that 
treats the agency’s views as relevant, but upholds the interpretation only if the 
court independently agrees it is the best reading.166 In contrast, nearly 75% 
apply a “sliding-scale model,” looking at contextual factors like consistency 
and thoroughness of consideration to determine whether to follow the agency’s 
guidance.167 Even among courts that apply a sliding scale model, there is no 
uniformity in how they do so, and they have different views about what 
Skidmore means.168 
Of course, replacing Auer with Skidmore likely would not change the 
outcome in the majority of cases, given the limits inherent in both doctrines 
and the similarities in how courts apply them.169 Some courts of appeals use 
an independent judgment model when applying both standards, and a shift 
from Auer to Skidmore would entail little change for those courts.170 Other 
courts apply a sliding scale model under both deference regimes, and many 
adopt the agency’s interpretation only after concluding the agency’s position is 
persuasive and reasonable. After all, Auer does not apply where the court finds 
the agency’s interpretation to be inconsistent with the regulation or poorly 
reasoned, and a court that finds an agency’s position invalid under Auer would 
similarly find it so under Skidmore. Even where courts ostensibly apply Auer, 
the reasoning can strongly resemble Skidmore at times.171 For these courts, the 
shift in doctrine would mean little to the ultimate outcome. 
The greatest cost of replacing Auer with Skidmore, however, would be the 
loss in predictability for regulated parties and agencies.172 Even when the 
outcome would be the same, the predictability of that outcome would vary. 
Auer is more predictable for two main reasons: the agency prevails at a higher 
rate under Auer, and Auer makes the agency’s view an easily understood 
guidepost for agencies and litigants. Without more direction about how courts 
should apply Skidmore, substituting it for Auer would bring substantial 
                                                                                                                     
 166 See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1271 (2007). 
 167 Id. at 1271, 1285. 
 168 Id. at 1238. 
 169 See Angstreich, supra note 11, at 86 (“[I]n many cases it will not matter whether a 
court selects Skidmore rather than Chevron or Seminole Rock.”). 
 170 See id. (“A court will reject an interpretation at odds with the plain meaning of a 
statute or regulation under any of the doctrines. Further, if the agency’s interpretation is 
either the most persuasive or unreasonable, then a court will reach the same result under all 
three doctrines . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Compare supra Table 7 (finding 20% of courts 
granting Auer deference reason that the agency’s interpretation is the best reading of the 
regulation), with Hickman & Krueger, supra note 166, at 1271 (finding nearly 19% of 
courts perform independent analysis under Skidmore).  
 171 See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 
281–84, 288–91 (2009); Healy, supra note 12, at 673 (arguing that the Court’s application 
of Auer in Coeur Alaska was equivalent to Skidmore review). 
 172 Angstreich, supra note 11, at 120–24. 
2015] AUER IN ACTION 843 
confusion about the weight to give an agency’s views about the meaning of its 
ambiguous regulation.173 
First, Auer increases predictability partly because courts adopt the 
agency’s view more often under Auer than Skidmore. Under Auer, regulated 
parties can be more confident that the court will adopt the agency’s view 
during litigation because courts more often do so under Auer than Skidmore. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that courts of appeals granted Auer deference in about 
75% of relevant cases since Talk America, with the rate falling to 71% since 
Decker. In contrast, a recent study revealed that courts of appeals accept the 
agency’s interpretation in 60% of Skidmore cases.174 
Second, agencies and regulated parties can anticipate deference more 
easily under Auer than Skidmore because Auer presents a clearer rule for 
judicial administration. Auer is simply better understood by everyone involved 
and provides greater certainty before litigation begins.175 While the difference 
in actual deference rates enhances Auer’s relative predictability, Auer also 
involves fewer balancing factors and gives courts a clearer rule to follow when 
confronted with an agency’s permissible interpretation of its ambiguous 
regulation. The agency prevails in the majority of cases whether the court 
applies Auer or Skidmore, but parties’ ability to anticipate that outcome varies 
with the clarity of the rule.176 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Independent Training & Apprenticeship 
Program v. California Department of Industrial Relations is illustrative of the 
confusion that replacing Auer with Skidmore would bring.177 In that case, the 
court withheld Auer deference from an interpretation offered by the 
Department of Labor in its amicus brief, reasoning that the agency’s position 
would create unfair surprise for regulated parties.178 The court then adopted 
the agency’s interpretation under Skidmore, treating that surprise as irrelevant 
to its ultimate conclusion.179 In another case, the D.C. Circuit similarly 
withheld Auer deference only to adopt the agency’s interpretation under 
Skidmore as “eminently reasonable.”180 
                                                                                                                     
 173 See Angstreich & Barmore, supra note 126, at 14 (“Considerable uncertainty 
would . . . likely attend a shift from Auer to Skidmore, making it more difficult for 
regulated firms to predict the force that an adverse or favorable agency interpretation will 
carry.”). 
 174 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 166, at 1275. 
 175 See Manning, supra note 11, at 694–95 (acknowledging Auer’s certainty benefits 
but arguing that “issues of determinacy cut both ways”). 
 176 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (“Predictability . . . is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. 
There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.”). 
 177 See Indep. Training & Apprenticeship Program v. Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 
730 F.3d 1024, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 178 Id. at 1035. 
 179 Id. at 1036. 
 180 In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig.—MDL 
No. 1993, 709 F.3d 1, 18–19 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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The choice between Auer and Skidmore matters most at the margins, when 
the outcome of the case is least predictable.181 Where the regulation or statute 
provides a clear answer, Auer and Skidmore compel the same result, and that 
clarity allows parties to anticipate the outcome regardless of the deference 
standard used. At the margins, however, the agency’s interpretation is either 
(1) a worse (but defensible) reading of the regulation, or (2) a permissible 
exercise of discretion to fill in the gaps of regulatory language or answer a 
difficult policy question. The central concern is whether marginal Auer cases 
usually fall in the first or second camp. As explained in Part II, the first 
category is the most concerning to critics, but there is little evidence that 
courts have accepted unreasonable interpretations in their decisions. Rather, 
Auer typically arises in the second category, and often implicates an agency’s 
discretionary policy choice. 
Replacing Auer with Skidmore would thus entail substantial costs in 
political accountability. Even proponents of replacing Auer with Skidmore 
acknowledge that “a post-Seminole Rock world would sometimes require 
courts to make interpretive policy judgments now reserved for relatively 
accountable administrative agencies.”182 The data show just how prevalent 
policy questions are in Auer cases. Courts granting Auer deference commonly 
reason that the interpretive question is one of policy that involves balancing 
        eting interests—a task best left to the administrative agency that 
Congress charged with implementing the regulatory scheme in question. 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co. is 
illustrative.183 There, the court reviewed an interpretation offered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency contained in the preamble to its 
regulation.184 The EPA’s interpretation of its ambiguous regulation required it 
to balance the public’s need for information against the agency’s need to 
implement its programs expeditiously, and the court saw no reason to conclude 
that the EPA’s resolution of those competing interests was not the product of 
its “fair and considered judgment.”185 Rather, the court reasoned, the EPA’s 
interpretation was an “eminently reasonable way to balance . . . competing 
interests.”186 Similar examples abound.187 Given that policy choices account 
                                                                                                                     
 181 See Angstreich, supra note 11, at 87–88 (“[T]he set of unpersuasive but reasonable 
interpretations of ambiguous regulations and statutes is relatively large and, in a case 
involving such an interpretation, the choice of doctrine is outcome determinative.”). 
 182 Manning, supra note 11, at 691. 
 183 See United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768 F.3d 662, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 184 Id. at 673. 
 185 Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 186 Id. 
 187 See, e.g., Rodysill v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2014) (deferring to the 
agency’s interpretation of its ambiguous regulation setting forth the agency’s “policy”); 
Suburban Air Freight, Inc. v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 716 F.3d 679, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“It 
is TSA’s job—not Suburban’s or ours—to strike a balance between convenience and 
security . . . .”). 
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for a substantial part of the work that Auer does, a shift to Skidmore would 
entail major costs to the political accountability of agency decision-making. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When the Court decides to revisit Auer, it will face compelling theoretical 
arguments on both sides of the issue. Auer raises problematic incentives for 
agencies that could undermine notice to regulated parties, and it carries the 
troubling idea of allowing a governmental body to interpret the rules it writes. 
Additionally, if Auer is held to violate the Administrative Procedure Act, its 
practical benefits will not save it. As the Court weighs concerns from critics, 
however, it should keep in mind the way these risks have played out and 
Auer’s benefits in practice. While Auer itself entails risks, it is important to 
measure the costs of a solution against the size of the problem at hand. 
Ultimately, the costs of overruling Auer likely outweigh the risks of 
retaining it. The data suggest that replacing Auer with Skidmore would entail 
substantial costs in reduced certainty for regulated parties and agencies and 
decreased political accountability. In comparison, courts of appeals have 
proven willing and able to reject the kind of agency interpretations that critics 
find most problematic. The Court already has placed significant limits on 
Auer, and courts of appeals have responded in the wake of Talk America by 
withholding deference from unreasonable agency interpretations. Auer’s critics 
raise a number of compelling concerns about how the doctrine could be 
misused, but there is no evidence that those concerns have materialized in 
practice. If the debate comes down to incentives, the data suggest there is little 
to gain (and much to lose) by rolling back Auer further. 
  
